917 lines
27 KiB
C
917 lines
27 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2006-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
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* internal use.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include "internal/constant_time.h"
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include <openssl/cms.h>
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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#include "crypto/rsa.h"
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#include "rsa_local.h"
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/* RSA pkey context structure */
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typedef struct {
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/* Key gen parameters */
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int nbits;
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BIGNUM *pub_exp;
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int primes;
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/* Keygen callback info */
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int gentmp[2];
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/* RSA padding mode */
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int pad_mode;
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/* message digest */
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const EVP_MD *md;
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/* message digest for MGF1 */
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const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
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/* PSS salt length */
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int saltlen;
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/* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
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int min_saltlen;
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/* Temp buffer */
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unsigned char *tbuf;
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/* OAEP label */
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unsigned char *oaep_label;
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size_t oaep_labellen;
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/* if to use implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption */
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int implicit_rejection;
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} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
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/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
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#define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1)
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static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx));
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if (rctx == NULL)
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return 0;
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rctx->nbits = 2048;
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rctx->primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM;
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if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
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rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
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else
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rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
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/* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
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rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
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rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
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rctx->implicit_rejection = 1;
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ctx->data = rctx;
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ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
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ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
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{
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
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if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
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return 0;
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sctx = src->data;
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dctx = dst->data;
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dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits;
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if (sctx->pub_exp) {
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dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp);
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if (!dctx->pub_exp)
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return 0;
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}
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dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode;
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dctx->md = sctx->md;
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dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md;
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dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen;
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dctx->implicit_rejection = sctx->implicit_rejection;
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if (sctx->oaep_label) {
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OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label);
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dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen);
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if (!dctx->oaep_label)
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return 0;
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dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
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{
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if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
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return 1;
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if ((ctx->tbuf =
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OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk->pkey)))) == NULL)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static void pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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if (rctx) {
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BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
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OPENSSL_free(rctx->tbuf);
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OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
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OPENSSL_free(rctx);
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}
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
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size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
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size_t tbslen)
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{
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int ret;
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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/*
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* Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
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* the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
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* be reflected back in the "original" key.
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*/
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RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
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if (rctx->md) {
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if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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return -1;
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}
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if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == NID_mdc2) {
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unsigned int sltmp;
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if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
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return -1;
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ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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ret = sltmp;
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} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
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if ((size_t)RSA_size(rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
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return -1;
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}
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
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return -1;
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}
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memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
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rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md));
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ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf,
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sig, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
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} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
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unsigned int sltmp;
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ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md),
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tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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ret = sltmp;
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} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa,
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rctx->tbuf, tbs,
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rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
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rctx->saltlen))
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return -1;
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ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
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sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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} else {
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return -1;
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}
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} else {
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ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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*siglen = ret;
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen,
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const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen)
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{
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int ret;
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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/*
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* Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
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* the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
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* be reflected back in the "original" key.
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*/
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RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
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if (rctx->md) {
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa,
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RSA_X931_PADDING);
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if (ret < 1)
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return 0;
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ret--;
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if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md))) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
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return 0;
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}
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if (ret != EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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if (rout)
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memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret);
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} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
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size_t sltmp;
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ret = ossl_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md),
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NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
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sig, siglen, rsa);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return 0;
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ret = sltmp;
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} else {
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return -1;
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}
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} else {
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ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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*routlen = ret;
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
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const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
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{
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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/*
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* Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
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* the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
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* be reflected back in the "original" key.
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*/
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RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
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size_t rslen;
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if (rctx->md) {
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
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return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
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sig, siglen, rsa);
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if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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return -1;
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}
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
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if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, siglen) <= 0)
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return 0;
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} else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
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int ret;
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
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rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return 0;
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ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs,
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rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
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rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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} else {
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return -1;
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}
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} else {
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf,
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rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
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if (rslen == 0)
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return 0;
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}
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if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
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{
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int ret;
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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/*
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* Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
|
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* the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
|
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* be reflected back in the "original" key.
|
|
*/
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RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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int klen = RSA_size(rsa);
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen,
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in, inlen,
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rctx->oaep_label,
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rctx->oaep_labellen,
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rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md))
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return -1;
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ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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} else {
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ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode);
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}
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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*outlen = ret;
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
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unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
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{
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int ret;
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int pad_mode;
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RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
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/*
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* Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of
|
|
* the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to
|
|
* be reflected back in the "original" key.
|
|
*/
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RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
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if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
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return -1;
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ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf,
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ret, ret,
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rctx->oaep_label,
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rctx->oaep_labellen,
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rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
|
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} else {
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if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING &&
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rctx->implicit_rejection == 0)
|
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pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING;
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else
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pad_mode = rctx->pad_mode;
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ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, pad_mode);
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}
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*outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret);
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ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1);
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return ret;
|
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}
|
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|
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static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
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{
|
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int mdnid;
|
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if (!md)
|
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return 1;
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|
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mdnid = EVP_MD_get_type(md);
|
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|
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if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
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return 0;
|
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}
|
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|
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if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
|
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if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
|
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
|
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return 0;
|
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}
|
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} else {
|
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switch (mdnid) {
|
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/* List of all supported RSA digests */
|
|
case NID_sha1:
|
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case NID_sha224:
|
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case NID_sha256:
|
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case NID_sha384:
|
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case NID_sha512:
|
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case NID_sha512_224:
|
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case NID_sha512_256:
|
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case NID_md5:
|
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case NID_md5_sha1:
|
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case NID_md2:
|
|
case NID_md4:
|
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case NID_mdc2:
|
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case NID_ripemd160:
|
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case NID_sha3_224:
|
|
case NID_sha3_256:
|
|
case NID_sha3_384:
|
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case NID_sha3_512:
|
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return 1;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
|
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if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) {
|
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if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1))
|
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return 0;
|
|
if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
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if (!(ctx->operation &
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(EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)))
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goto bad_pad;
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if (!rctx->md)
|
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rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
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} else if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
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goto bad_pad;
|
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}
|
|
if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
|
if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
|
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goto bad_pad;
|
|
if (!rctx->md)
|
|
rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
|
|
}
|
|
rctx->pad_mode = p1;
|
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return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
bad_pad:
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING:
|
|
*(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN:
|
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
|
|
*(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX)
|
|
return -2;
|
|
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
|
if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
|
|
&& ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
|
|
&& rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md))
|
|
|| (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
rctx->saltlen = p1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
|
|
if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
rctx->nbits = p1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP:
|
|
if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
BN_free(rctx->pub_exp);
|
|
rctx->pub_exp = p2;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES:
|
|
if (p1 < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || p1 > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
rctx->primes = p1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
|
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD)
|
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
|
else
|
|
rctx->md = p2;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
|
|
if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
|
if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
rctx->md = p2;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
|
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD:
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD:
|
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
|
|
&& rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) {
|
|
if (rctx->mgf1md)
|
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
|
|
else
|
|
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
|
if (EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_get_type(p2))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
rctx->mgf1md = p2;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
|
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(rctx->oaep_label);
|
|
if (p2 && p1 > 0) {
|
|
rctx->oaep_label = p2;
|
|
rctx->oaep_labellen = p1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
rctx->oaep_label = NULL;
|
|
rctx->oaep_labellen = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
|
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (p2 == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label;
|
|
return rctx->oaep_labellen;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION:
|
|
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
rctx->implicit_rejection = p1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
|
|
#endif
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
/* fall through */
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
|
const char *type, const char *value)
|
|
{
|
|
if (value == NULL) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) {
|
|
int pm;
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
|
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
|
|
pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {
|
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) {
|
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) {
|
|
pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) {
|
|
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
|
|
int saltlen;
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(value, "digest"))
|
|
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(value, "max"))
|
|
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(value, "auto"))
|
|
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
|
|
else
|
|
saltlen = atoi(value);
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
|
|
int nbits = atoi(value);
|
|
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
|
|
if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp);
|
|
BN_free(pubexp);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_primes") == 0) {
|
|
int nprimes = atoi(value);
|
|
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, nprimes);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0)
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
|
|
|
|
if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0)
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0)
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value);
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) {
|
|
int saltlen = atoi(value);
|
|
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0)
|
|
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value);
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) {
|
|
unsigned char *lab;
|
|
long lablen;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen);
|
|
if (!lab)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(lab);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary */
|
|
static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
|
|
|
if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
/* If all parameters are default values don't set pss */
|
|
if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && rctx->saltlen == -2)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
rsa->pss = ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
|
|
rctx->saltlen == -2
|
|
? 0 : rctx->saltlen);
|
|
if (rsa->pss == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
|
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
|
BN_GENCB *pcb;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) {
|
|
rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
|
|
if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
rsa = RSA_new();
|
|
if (rsa == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (ctx->pkey_gencb) {
|
|
pcb = BN_GENCB_new();
|
|
if (pcb == NULL) {
|
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
|
|
} else {
|
|
pcb = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->primes,
|
|
rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
|
|
BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
|
|
if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) {
|
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret > 0)
|
|
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa);
|
|
else
|
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
|
|
EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
|
|
pkey_rsa_init,
|
|
pkey_rsa_copy,
|
|
pkey_rsa_cleanup,
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
pkey_rsa_keygen,
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
pkey_rsa_sign,
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
pkey_rsa_verify,
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
pkey_rsa_verifyrecover,
|
|
|
|
0, 0, 0, 0,
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
pkey_rsa_encrypt,
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
pkey_rsa_decrypt,
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
pkey_rsa_ctrl,
|
|
pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return &rsa_pkey_meth;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter
|
|
* sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
const RSA *rsa;
|
|
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
|
|
int min_saltlen, max_saltlen;
|
|
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey);
|
|
/* If no restrictions just return */
|
|
if (rsa->pss == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
/* Get and check parameters */
|
|
if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
|
|
max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_get_size(md);
|
|
if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
|
|
max_saltlen--;
|
|
if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
|
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to
|
|
* use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rctx->md = md;
|
|
rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md;
|
|
rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = {
|
|
EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
|
|
EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
|
|
pkey_rsa_init,
|
|
pkey_rsa_copy,
|
|
pkey_rsa_cleanup,
|
|
|
|
0, 0,
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
pkey_rsa_keygen,
|
|
|
|
pkey_pss_init,
|
|
pkey_rsa_sign,
|
|
|
|
pkey_pss_init,
|
|
pkey_rsa_verify,
|
|
|
|
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
|
|
|
pkey_rsa_ctrl,
|
|
pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pss_pkey_method(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return &rsa_pss_pkey_meth;
|
|
}
|