/* * Copyright 2007-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019 * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "cmp_local.h" #include "crypto/asn1.h" /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */ #include #include #include #include #include /* * This function is also used by the internal verify_PBMAC() in cmp_vfy.c. * * Calculate protection for |msg| according to |msg->header->protectionAlg| * using the credentials, library context, and property criteria in the ctx. * Unless |msg->header->protectionAlg| is PasswordBasedMAC, * its value is completed according to |ctx->pkey| and |ctx->digest|, * where the latter irrelevant in the case of Edwards curves. * * returns ASN1_BIT_STRING representing the protection on success, else NULL */ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) { ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL; OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part; const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL; const void *ppval = NULL; int pptype = 0; if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL)) return NULL; /* construct data to be signed */ prot_part.header = msg->header; prot_part.body = msg->body; if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID); return NULL; } X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg); if (OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) { int len; size_t prot_part_der_len; unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL; size_t sig_len; unsigned char *protection = NULL; OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL; ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL; const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL; if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PBM_SECRET); return NULL; } if (ppval == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION); return NULL; } len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der); if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION); goto end; } prot_part_der_len = (size_t)len; pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval; pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data; pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length); if (pbm == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID); goto end; } if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq, pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len, ctx->secretValue->data, ctx->secretValue->length, &protection, &sig_len)) goto end; if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) goto end; /* OpenSSL by default encodes all bit strings as ASN.1 NamedBitList */ ossl_asn1_string_set_bits_left(prot, 0); if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) { ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot); prot = NULL; } end: OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm); OPENSSL_free(protection); OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der); return prot; } else { const EVP_MD *md = ctx->digest; char name[80] = ""; if (ctx->pkey == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION); return NULL; } if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_name(ctx->pkey, name, sizeof(name)) > 0 && strcmp(name, "UNDEF") == 0) /* at least for Ed25519, Ed448 */ md = NULL; if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) return NULL; if (ASN1_item_sign_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART), msg->header->protectionAlg, /* sets X509_ALGOR */ NULL, prot, &prot_part, NULL, ctx->pkey, md, ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) return prot; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot); return NULL; } } /* ctx is not const just because ctx->chain may get adapted */ int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) { if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL)) return 0; /* Add first ctx->cert and its chain if using signature-based protection */ if (!ctx->unprotectedSend && ctx->secretValue == NULL && ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) { int prepend = X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS; /* if not yet done try to build chain using available untrusted certs */ if (ctx->chain == NULL) { ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "trying to build chain for own CMP signer cert"); ctx->chain = X509_build_chain(ctx->cert, ctx->untrusted, NULL, 0, ctx->libctx, ctx->propq); if (ctx->chain != NULL) { ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "success building chain for own CMP signer cert"); } else { /* dump errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */ OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx); ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "could not build chain for own CMP signer cert"); } } if (ctx->chain != NULL) { if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->chain, prepend)) return 0; } else { /* make sure that at least our own signer cert is included first */ if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->cert, prepend)) return 0; ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "fallback: adding just own CMP signer cert"); } } /* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */ if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP)) return 0; /* in case extraCerts are empty list avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */ if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) { sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts); msg->extraCerts = NULL; } return 1; } /* * Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on * the pbm settings in the context */ static X509_ALGOR *pbmac_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx) { OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL; unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL; int pbm_der_len; ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL; X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL; if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL)) return NULL; pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->pbm_slen, EVP_MD_get_type(ctx->pbm_owf), ctx->pbm_itercnt, ctx->pbm_mac); pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (pbm == NULL || pbm_str == NULL) goto err; if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0) goto err; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len)) goto err; alg = ossl_X509_ALGOR_from_nid(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str); err: if (alg == NULL) ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str); OPENSSL_free(pbm_der); OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm); return alg; } static int set_senderKID(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id) { if (id == NULL) id = ctx->referenceValue; /* standard for PBM, fallback for sig-based */ return id == NULL || ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, id); } /* ctx is not const just because ctx->chain may get adapted */ int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) { if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL)) return 0; /* * For the case of re-protection remove pre-existing protection. * Does not remove any pre-existing extraCerts. */ X509_ALGOR_free(msg->header->protectionAlg); msg->header->protectionAlg = NULL; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(msg->protection); msg->protection = NULL; if (ctx->unprotectedSend) { if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, NULL)) goto err; } else if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) { /* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */ if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = pbmac_algor(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, NULL)) goto err; /* * will add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut * while not needed to validate the protection certificate, * the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases */ } else if (ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) { /* use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client cert and key given */ /* make sure that key and certificate match */ if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->pkey)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH); goto err; } if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL) goto err; /* set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the cert according to 5.1.1 */ if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->cert))) goto err; /* * will add ctx->cert followed, if possible, by its chain built * from ctx->untrusted, and then ctx->extraCertsOut */ } else { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION); goto err; } if (!ctx->unprotectedSend /* protect according to msg->header->protectionAlg partly set above */ && ((msg->protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL)) goto err; /* * For signature-based protection add ctx->cert followed by its chain. * Finally add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut; * even if not needed to validate the protection * the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases. */ if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg)) goto err; /* * As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known * to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least * the senderKID must be set, where we took the referenceValue as fallback. */ if (!(ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(msg->header->sender) && msg->header->senderKID == NULL)) return 1; ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION); err: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE); return 0; }