4155 lines
134 KiB
C
4155 lines
134 KiB
C
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/*
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* Copyright 2001-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/*
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* This file uses the low-level AES functions (which are deprecated for
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* non-internal use) in order to implement the EVP AES ciphers.
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*/
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#include "internal/deprecated.h"
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#include <string.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/aes.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/cmac.h>
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "crypto/modes.h"
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#include "crypto/siv.h"
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#include "crypto/aes_platform.h"
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#include "evp_local.h"
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typedef struct {
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union {
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OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
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AES_KEY ks;
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} ks;
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block128_f block;
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union {
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cbc128_f cbc;
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ctr128_f ctr;
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} stream;
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} EVP_AES_KEY;
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typedef struct {
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union {
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OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
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AES_KEY ks;
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} ks; /* AES key schedule to use */
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int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
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int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */
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GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
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unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */
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int ivlen; /* IV length */
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int taglen;
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int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */
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int iv_gen_rand; /* No IV was specified, so generate a rand IV */
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int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */
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uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
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ctr128_f ctr;
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} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
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typedef struct {
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union {
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OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
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AES_KEY ks;
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} ks1, ks2; /* AES key schedules to use */
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XTS128_CONTEXT xts;
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void (*stream) (const unsigned char *in,
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unsigned char *out, size_t length,
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const AES_KEY *key1, const AES_KEY *key2,
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const unsigned char iv[16]);
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} EVP_AES_XTS_CTX;
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#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
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static const int allow_insecure_decrypt = 0;
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#else
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static const int allow_insecure_decrypt = 1;
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#endif
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typedef struct {
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union {
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OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
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AES_KEY ks;
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} ks; /* AES key schedule to use */
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int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
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int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */
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int tag_set; /* Set if tag is valid */
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int len_set; /* Set if message length set */
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int L, M; /* L and M parameters from RFC3610 */
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int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */
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CCM128_CONTEXT ccm;
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ccm128_f str;
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} EVP_AES_CCM_CTX;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
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typedef struct {
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union {
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OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
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AES_KEY ks;
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} ksenc; /* AES key schedule to use for encryption */
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union {
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OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
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AES_KEY ks;
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} ksdec; /* AES key schedule to use for decryption */
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int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
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int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */
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OCB128_CONTEXT ocb;
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unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */
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unsigned char tag[16];
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unsigned char data_buf[16]; /* Store partial data blocks */
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unsigned char aad_buf[16]; /* Store partial AAD blocks */
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int data_buf_len;
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int aad_buf_len;
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int ivlen; /* IV length */
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int taglen;
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} EVP_AES_OCB_CTX;
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#endif
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#define MAXBITCHUNK ((size_t)1<<(sizeof(size_t)*8-4))
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/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
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static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
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{
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int n = 8;
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unsigned char c;
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do {
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--n;
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c = counter[n];
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++c;
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counter[n] = c;
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if (c)
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return;
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} while (n);
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}
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#if defined(AESNI_CAPABLE)
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# if defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64)
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# define AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx) (gctx->gcm.block==(block128_f)aesni_encrypt && \
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gctx->gcm.ghash==gcm_ghash_avx)
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# undef AES_GCM_ASM2 /* minor size optimization */
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# endif
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static int aesni_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
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const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
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{
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int ret, mode;
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EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
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const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
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if (keylen <= 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx);
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if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
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&& !enc) {
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ret = aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks);
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dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
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dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
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(cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
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} else {
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ret = aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks);
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dat->block = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
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if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
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dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aesni_cbc_encrypt;
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else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
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dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
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else
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dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
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}
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if (ret < 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int aesni_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
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{
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aesni_cbc_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx)->ks.ks,
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ctx->iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx));
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return 1;
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}
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static int aesni_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
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{
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size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ctx);
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if (len < bl)
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return 1;
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aesni_ecb_encrypt(in, out, len, &EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx)->ks.ks,
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx));
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return 1;
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}
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# define aesni_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher
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static int aesni_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
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# define aesni_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
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static int aesni_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
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# define aesni_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
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static int aesni_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
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# define aesni_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
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static int aesni_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
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# define aesni_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
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static int aesni_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
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static int aesni_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
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const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
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{
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EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx);
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if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
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return 1;
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if (key) {
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const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
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if (keylen <= 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks);
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CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt);
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gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aesni_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
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/*
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* If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
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*/
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if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
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iv = gctx->iv;
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if (iv) {
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CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
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gctx->iv_set = 1;
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}
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gctx->key_set = 1;
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} else {
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/* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
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if (gctx->key_set)
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CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
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else
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memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
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gctx->iv_set = 1;
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gctx->iv_gen = 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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# define aesni_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher
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static int aesni_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
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static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
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const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
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{
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EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
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if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
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return 1;
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if (key) {
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/* The key is two half length keys in reality */
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const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx);
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const int bytes = keylen / 2;
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const int bits = bytes * 8;
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if (keylen <= 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Verify that the two keys are different.
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*
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* This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
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* See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
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*/
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if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc)
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&& CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
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return 0;
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}
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/* key_len is two AES keys */
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if (enc) {
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aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
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xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
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xctx->stream = aesni_xts_encrypt;
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} else {
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aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
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xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
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xctx->stream = aesni_xts_decrypt;
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}
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aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
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xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
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xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
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}
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if (iv) {
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xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
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memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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# define aesni_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
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static int aesni_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
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static int aesni_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
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const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
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{
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EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
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if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
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return 1;
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if (key != NULL) {
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const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
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if (keylen <= 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks);
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CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
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&cctx->ks, (block128_f) aesni_encrypt);
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cctx->str = enc ? (ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks :
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(ccm128_f) aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks;
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cctx->key_set = 1;
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}
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if (iv) {
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memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L);
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cctx->iv_set = 1;
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}
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return 1;
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}
|
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# define aesni_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher
|
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static int aesni_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
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# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
|
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static int aesni_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
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const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
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{
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EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
|
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|
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if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
|
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return 1;
|
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|
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if (key != NULL) {
|
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const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
|
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|
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if (keylen <= 0) {
|
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
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return 0;
|
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}
|
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do {
|
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/*
|
||
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* We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt
|
||
|
* needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the
|
||
|
* decrypt for an encryption operation.
|
||
|
*/
|
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aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks);
|
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aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks);
|
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if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
|
||
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&octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
|
||
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(block128_f) aesni_encrypt,
|
||
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(block128_f) aesni_decrypt,
|
||
|
enc ? aesni_ocb_encrypt
|
||
|
: aesni_ocb_decrypt))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
while (0);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set)
|
||
|
iv = octx->iv;
|
||
|
if (iv) {
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen)
|
||
|
!= 1)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
octx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
octx->key_set = 1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
|
||
|
if (octx->key_set)
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen);
|
||
|
octx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aesni_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher
|
||
|
static int aesni_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aesni_init_key, \
|
||
|
aesni_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
|
||
|
NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \
|
||
|
keylen/8,ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aes_init_key, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
|
||
|
NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
|
||
|
{ return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
|
||
|
(EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
|
||
|
ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aesni_##mode##_init_key, \
|
||
|
aesni_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
|
||
|
NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
|
||
|
(EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
|
||
|
ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
|
||
|
NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
|
||
|
{ return AESNI_CAPABLE?&aesni_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
|
||
|
|
||
|
#elif defined(SPARC_AES_CAPABLE)
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ret, mode, bits;
|
||
|
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx);
|
||
|
bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
|
||
|
if (bits <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
|
||
|
&& !enc) {
|
||
|
ret = 0;
|
||
|
aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks);
|
||
|
dat->block = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt;
|
||
|
switch (bits) {
|
||
|
case 128:
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
|
||
|
(cbc128_f) aes128_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
case 192:
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
|
||
|
(cbc128_f) aes192_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
case 256:
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
|
||
|
(cbc128_f) aes256_t4_cbc_decrypt : NULL;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
ret = -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
ret = 0;
|
||
|
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &dat->ks.ks);
|
||
|
dat->block = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt;
|
||
|
switch (bits) {
|
||
|
case 128:
|
||
|
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes128_t4_cbc_encrypt;
|
||
|
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
|
||
|
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
case 192:
|
||
|
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes192_t4_cbc_encrypt;
|
||
|
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
|
||
|
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
case 256:
|
||
|
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) aes256_t4_cbc_encrypt;
|
||
|
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
|
||
|
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
ret = -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_ecb_cipher aes_ecb_cipher
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_ofb_cipher aes_ofb_cipher
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_cfb_cipher aes_cfb_cipher
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_cfb8_cipher aes_cfb8_cipher
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
if (key) {
|
||
|
const int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (bits <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &gctx->ks.ks);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
|
||
|
(block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt);
|
||
|
switch (bits) {
|
||
|
case 128:
|
||
|
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes128_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
case 192:
|
||
|
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes192_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
case 256:
|
||
|
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) aes256_t4_ctr32_encrypt;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
|
||
|
iv = gctx->iv;
|
||
|
if (iv) {
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
gctx->key_set = 1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
|
||
|
if (gctx->key_set)
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
gctx->iv_gen = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_gcm_cipher aes_gcm_cipher
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!iv && !key)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key) {
|
||
|
/* The key is two half length keys in reality */
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx);
|
||
|
const int bytes = keylen / 2;
|
||
|
const int bits = bytes * 8;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Verify that the two keys are different.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
|
||
|
* See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc)
|
||
|
&& CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
xctx->stream = NULL;
|
||
|
/* key_len is two AES keys */
|
||
|
if (enc) {
|
||
|
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt;
|
||
|
switch (bits) {
|
||
|
case 128:
|
||
|
xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_encrypt;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
case 256:
|
||
|
xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_encrypt;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt;
|
||
|
switch (bits) {
|
||
|
case 128:
|
||
|
xctx->stream = aes128_t4_xts_decrypt;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
case 256:
|
||
|
xctx->stream = aes256_t4_xts_decrypt;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt;
|
||
|
|
||
|
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv) {
|
||
|
xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
|
||
|
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key != NULL) {
|
||
|
const int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (bits <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &cctx->ks.ks);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
|
||
|
&cctx->ks, (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt);
|
||
|
cctx->str = NULL;
|
||
|
cctx->key_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (iv) {
|
||
|
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L);
|
||
|
cctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_ccm_cipher aes_ccm_cipher
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key != NULL) {
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
do {
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt
|
||
|
* needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the
|
||
|
* decrypt for an encryption operation.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks);
|
||
|
aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks);
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
|
||
|
&octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
|
||
|
(block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt,
|
||
|
(block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt,
|
||
|
NULL))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
while (0);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set)
|
||
|
iv = octx->iv;
|
||
|
if (iv) {
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen)
|
||
|
!= 1)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
octx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
octx->key_set = 1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
|
||
|
if (octx->key_set)
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen);
|
||
|
octx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher
|
||
|
static int aes_t4_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
|
||
|
|
||
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key
|
||
|
# define aes_t4_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher
|
||
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SIV */
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aes_t4_init_key, \
|
||
|
aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
|
||
|
NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \
|
||
|
keylen/8,ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aes_init_key, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
|
||
|
NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
|
||
|
{ return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE?&aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
|
||
|
(EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
|
||
|
ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aes_t4_##mode##_init_key, \
|
||
|
aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
|
||
|
NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
|
||
|
(EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
|
||
|
ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
|
||
|
NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
|
||
|
{ return SPARC_AES_CAPABLE?&aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode:&aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
|
||
|
|
||
|
#elif defined(S390X_aes_128_CAPABLE)
|
||
|
/* IBM S390X support */
|
||
|
typedef struct {
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* KM-AES parameter block - begin
|
||
|
* (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-06)
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
struct {
|
||
|
unsigned char k[32];
|
||
|
} param;
|
||
|
/* KM-AES parameter block - end */
|
||
|
} km;
|
||
|
unsigned int fc;
|
||
|
} S390X_AES_ECB_CTX;
|
||
|
|
||
|
typedef struct {
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* KMO-AES parameter block - begin
|
||
|
* (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
struct {
|
||
|
unsigned char cv[16];
|
||
|
unsigned char k[32];
|
||
|
} param;
|
||
|
/* KMO-AES parameter block - end */
|
||
|
} kmo;
|
||
|
unsigned int fc;
|
||
|
} S390X_AES_OFB_CTX;
|
||
|
|
||
|
typedef struct {
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* KMF-AES parameter block - begin
|
||
|
* (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
struct {
|
||
|
unsigned char cv[16];
|
||
|
unsigned char k[32];
|
||
|
} param;
|
||
|
/* KMF-AES parameter block - end */
|
||
|
} kmf;
|
||
|
unsigned int fc;
|
||
|
} S390X_AES_CFB_CTX;
|
||
|
|
||
|
typedef struct {
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - begin
|
||
|
* (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-11)
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
struct {
|
||
|
unsigned char reserved[12];
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
unsigned int w;
|
||
|
unsigned char b[4];
|
||
|
} cv;
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
unsigned long long g[2];
|
||
|
unsigned char b[16];
|
||
|
} t;
|
||
|
unsigned char h[16];
|
||
|
unsigned long long taadl;
|
||
|
unsigned long long tpcl;
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
unsigned long long g[2];
|
||
|
unsigned int w[4];
|
||
|
} j0;
|
||
|
unsigned char k[32];
|
||
|
} param;
|
||
|
/* KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - end */
|
||
|
} kma;
|
||
|
unsigned int fc;
|
||
|
int key_set;
|
||
|
|
||
|
unsigned char *iv;
|
||
|
int ivlen;
|
||
|
int iv_set;
|
||
|
int iv_gen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
int taglen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
unsigned char ares[16];
|
||
|
unsigned char mres[16];
|
||
|
unsigned char kres[16];
|
||
|
int areslen;
|
||
|
int mreslen;
|
||
|
int kreslen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
int tls_aad_len;
|
||
|
uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
|
||
|
} S390X_AES_GCM_CTX;
|
||
|
|
||
|
typedef struct {
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Padding is chosen so that ccm.kmac_param.k overlaps with key.k and
|
||
|
* ccm.fc with key.k.rounds. Remember that on s390x, an AES_KEY's
|
||
|
* rounds field is used to store the function code and that the key
|
||
|
* schedule is not stored (if aes hardware support is detected).
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
struct {
|
||
|
unsigned char pad[16];
|
||
|
AES_KEY k;
|
||
|
} key;
|
||
|
|
||
|
struct {
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* KMAC-AES parameter block - begin
|
||
|
* (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
struct {
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
unsigned long long g[2];
|
||
|
unsigned char b[16];
|
||
|
} icv;
|
||
|
unsigned char k[32];
|
||
|
} kmac_param;
|
||
|
/* KMAC-AES parameter block - end */
|
||
|
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
unsigned long long g[2];
|
||
|
unsigned char b[16];
|
||
|
} nonce;
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
unsigned long long g[2];
|
||
|
unsigned char b[16];
|
||
|
} buf;
|
||
|
|
||
|
unsigned long long blocks;
|
||
|
int l;
|
||
|
int m;
|
||
|
int tls_aad_len;
|
||
|
int iv_set;
|
||
|
int tag_set;
|
||
|
int len_set;
|
||
|
int key_set;
|
||
|
|
||
|
unsigned char pad[140];
|
||
|
unsigned int fc;
|
||
|
} ccm;
|
||
|
} aes;
|
||
|
} S390X_AES_CCM_CTX;
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_init_key aes_init_key
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define S390X_AES_CBC_CTX EVP_AES_KEY
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_cbc_init_key aes_init_key
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_cbc_cipher aes_cbc_cipher
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ecb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
|
||
|
if (!enc)
|
||
|
cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(cctx->km.param.k, key, keylen);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_ECB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_ECB_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
s390x_km(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->km.param);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ofb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv;
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx);
|
||
|
const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (ivlen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
|
||
|
memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.k, key, keylen);
|
||
|
cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_OFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_OFB_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
|
||
|
unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
|
||
|
int n = ctx->num;
|
||
|
int rem;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(cctx->kmo.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
|
||
|
while (n && len) {
|
||
|
*out = *in ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n];
|
||
|
n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
|
||
|
--len;
|
||
|
++in;
|
||
|
++out;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
rem = len & 0xf;
|
||
|
|
||
|
len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
|
||
|
if (len) {
|
||
|
s390x_kmo(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmo.param);
|
||
|
|
||
|
out += len;
|
||
|
in += len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (rem) {
|
||
|
s390x_km(cctx->kmo.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmo.param.cv, cctx->fc,
|
||
|
cctx->kmo.param.k);
|
||
|
|
||
|
while (rem--) {
|
||
|
out[n] = in[n] ^ cctx->kmo.param.cv[n];
|
||
|
++n;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(iv, cctx->kmo.param.cv, ivlen);
|
||
|
ctx->num = n;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_cfb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv;
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx);
|
||
|
const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (ivlen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
|
||
|
cctx->fc |= 16 << 24; /* 16 bytes cipher feedback */
|
||
|
if (!enc)
|
||
|
cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
|
||
|
memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx);
|
||
|
const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx);
|
||
|
const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
|
||
|
unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
|
||
|
int n = ctx->num;
|
||
|
int rem;
|
||
|
unsigned char tmp;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (ivlen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
|
||
|
while (n && len) {
|
||
|
tmp = *in;
|
||
|
*out = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp;
|
||
|
cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? *out : tmp;
|
||
|
n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
|
||
|
--len;
|
||
|
++in;
|
||
|
++out;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
rem = len & 0xf;
|
||
|
|
||
|
len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
|
||
|
if (len) {
|
||
|
s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param);
|
||
|
|
||
|
out += len;
|
||
|
in += len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (rem) {
|
||
|
s390x_km(cctx->kmf.param.cv, 16, cctx->kmf.param.cv,
|
||
|
S390X_AES_FC(keylen), cctx->kmf.param.k);
|
||
|
|
||
|
while (rem--) {
|
||
|
tmp = in[n];
|
||
|
out[n] = cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] ^ tmp;
|
||
|
cctx->kmf.param.cv[n] = enc ? out[n] : tmp;
|
||
|
++n;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(iv, cctx->kmf.param.cv, ivlen);
|
||
|
ctx->num = n;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_cfb8_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *ivec, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv = ctx->oiv;
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx);
|
||
|
const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (ivlen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
cctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
|
||
|
cctx->fc |= 1 << 24; /* 1 byte cipher feedback */
|
||
|
if (!enc)
|
||
|
cctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
|
||
|
memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.k, key, keylen);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_CFB_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CFB_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
const int ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
|
||
|
unsigned char *iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(cctx->kmf.param.cv, iv, ivlen);
|
||
|
s390x_kmf(in, len, out, cctx->fc, &cctx->kmf.param);
|
||
|
memcpy(iv, cctx->kmf.param.cv, ivlen);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_cfb1_init_key aes_init_key
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher aes_cfb1_cipher
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define S390X_AES_CTR_CTX EVP_AES_KEY
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_ctr_init_key aes_init_key
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_ctr_cipher aes_ctr_cipher
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* iv + padding length for iv lengths != 12 */
|
||
|
# define S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(i) ((((i) + 15) >> 4 << 4) + 16)
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Process additional authenticated data. Returns 0 on success. Code is
|
||
|
* big-endian.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_gcm_aad(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
|
||
|
size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned long long alen;
|
||
|
int n, rem;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ctx->kma.param.tpcl)
|
||
|
return -2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
alen = ctx->kma.param.taadl + len;
|
||
|
if (alen > (U64(1) << 61) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && alen < len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.taadl = alen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n = ctx->areslen;
|
||
|
if (n) {
|
||
|
while (n && len) {
|
||
|
ctx->ares[n] = *aad;
|
||
|
n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
|
||
|
++aad;
|
||
|
--len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* ctx->ares contains a complete block if offset has wrapped around */
|
||
|
if (!n) {
|
||
|
s390x_kma(ctx->ares, 16, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param);
|
||
|
ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
ctx->areslen = n;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
rem = len & 0xf;
|
||
|
|
||
|
len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
|
||
|
if (len) {
|
||
|
s390x_kma(aad, len, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param);
|
||
|
aad += len;
|
||
|
ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (rem) {
|
||
|
ctx->areslen = rem;
|
||
|
|
||
|
do {
|
||
|
--rem;
|
||
|
ctx->ares[rem] = aad[rem];
|
||
|
} while (rem);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate ciphertext. Returns 0 for
|
||
|
* success. Code is big-endian.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_gcm(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
|
||
|
unsigned char *out, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
const unsigned char *inptr;
|
||
|
unsigned long long mlen;
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
unsigned int w[4];
|
||
|
unsigned char b[16];
|
||
|
} buf;
|
||
|
size_t inlen;
|
||
|
int n, rem, i;
|
||
|
|
||
|
mlen = ctx->kma.param.tpcl + len;
|
||
|
if (mlen > ((U64(1) << 36) - 32) || (sizeof(len) == 8 && mlen < len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.tpcl = mlen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
n = ctx->mreslen;
|
||
|
if (n) {
|
||
|
inptr = in;
|
||
|
inlen = len;
|
||
|
while (n && inlen) {
|
||
|
ctx->mres[n] = *inptr;
|
||
|
n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
|
||
|
++inptr;
|
||
|
--inlen;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* ctx->mres contains a complete block if offset has wrapped around */
|
||
|
if (!n) {
|
||
|
s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, ctx->mres, 16, buf.b,
|
||
|
ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param);
|
||
|
ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS;
|
||
|
ctx->areslen = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* previous call already encrypted/decrypted its remainder,
|
||
|
* see comment below */
|
||
|
n = ctx->mreslen;
|
||
|
while (n) {
|
||
|
*out = buf.b[n];
|
||
|
n = (n + 1) & 0xf;
|
||
|
++out;
|
||
|
++in;
|
||
|
--len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
ctx->mreslen = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
rem = len & 0xf;
|
||
|
|
||
|
len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
|
||
|
if (len) {
|
||
|
s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, in, len, out,
|
||
|
ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param);
|
||
|
in += len;
|
||
|
out += len;
|
||
|
ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS;
|
||
|
ctx->areslen = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* If there is a remainder, it has to be saved such that it can be
|
||
|
* processed by kma later. However, we also have to do the for-now
|
||
|
* unauthenticated encryption/decryption part here and now...
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (rem) {
|
||
|
if (!ctx->mreslen) {
|
||
|
buf.w[0] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[0];
|
||
|
buf.w[1] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[1];
|
||
|
buf.w[2] = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[2];
|
||
|
buf.w[3] = ctx->kma.param.cv.w + 1;
|
||
|
s390x_km(buf.b, 16, ctx->kres, ctx->fc & 0x1f, &ctx->kma.param.k);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
n = ctx->mreslen;
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < rem; i++) {
|
||
|
ctx->mres[n + i] = in[i];
|
||
|
out[i] = in[i] ^ ctx->kres[n + i];
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
ctx->mreslen += rem;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Initialize context structure. Code is big-endian.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static void s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.t.g[0] = 0;
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.t.g[1] = 0;
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.tpcl = 0;
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.taadl = 0;
|
||
|
ctx->mreslen = 0;
|
||
|
ctx->areslen = 0;
|
||
|
ctx->kreslen = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ctx->ivlen == 12) {
|
||
|
memcpy(&ctx->kma.param.j0, iv, ctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.j0.w[3] = 1;
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.cv.w = 1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* ctx->iv has the right size and is already padded. */
|
||
|
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
s390x_kma(ctx->iv, S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(ctx->ivlen), NULL, 0, NULL,
|
||
|
ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param);
|
||
|
ctx->fc |= S390X_KMA_HS;
|
||
|
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.j0.g[0] = ctx->kma.param.t.g[0];
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.j0.g[1] = ctx->kma.param.t.g[1];
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.cv.w = ctx->kma.param.j0.w[3];
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.t.g[0] = 0;
|
||
|
ctx->kma.param.t.g[1] = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control
|
||
|
* type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type.
|
||
|
* Code is big-endian.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c);
|
||
|
S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out;
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out;
|
||
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
||
|
int ivlen, enc, len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
switch (type) {
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
|
||
|
ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher);
|
||
|
gctx->key_set = 0;
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
gctx->ivlen = ivlen;
|
||
|
gctx->iv = c->iv;
|
||
|
gctx->taglen = -1;
|
||
|
gctx->iv_gen = 0;
|
||
|
gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
|
||
|
*(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
|
||
|
if (arg <= 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (arg != 12) {
|
||
|
len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(arg);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Allocate memory for iv if needed. */
|
||
|
if (gctx->ivlen == 12 || len > S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen)) {
|
||
|
if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* Add padding. */
|
||
|
memset(gctx->iv + arg, 0, len - arg - 8);
|
||
|
*((unsigned long long *)(gctx->iv + len - 8)) = arg << 3;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
gctx->ivlen = arg;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
|
||
|
buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
|
||
|
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c);
|
||
|
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || enc)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
gctx->taglen = arg;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
|
||
|
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c);
|
||
|
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !enc || gctx->taglen < 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(ptr, gctx->kma.param.t.b, arg);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
|
||
|
/* Special case: -1 length restores whole iv */
|
||
|
if (arg == -1) {
|
||
|
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least
|
||
|
* 8.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (arg)
|
||
|
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
|
||
|
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c);
|
||
|
if (enc && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN:
|
||
|
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen)
|
||
|
arg = gctx->ivlen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
|
||
|
* to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
|
||
|
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c);
|
||
|
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || enc)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, gctx->iv);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
|
||
|
/* Save the aad for later use. */
|
||
|
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
|
||
|
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
|
||
|
gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
|
||
|
/* Correct length for explicit iv. */
|
||
|
if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If decrypting correct for tag too. */
|
||
|
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c);
|
||
|
if (!enc) {
|
||
|
if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
|
||
|
buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
|
||
|
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */
|
||
|
return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
|
||
|
out = ptr;
|
||
|
gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, out);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (gctx->iv == c->iv) {
|
||
|
gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, len);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Set key and/or iv. Returns 1 on success. Otherwise 0 is returned.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
int keylen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key != NULL) {
|
||
|
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx);
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(&gctx->kma.param.k, key, keylen);
|
||
|
|
||
|
gctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
|
||
|
if (!enc)
|
||
|
gctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
|
||
|
iv = gctx->iv;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv != NULL) {
|
||
|
s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
gctx->key_set = 1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (gctx->key_set)
|
||
|
s390x_aes_gcm_setiv(gctx, iv);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
gctx->iv_gen = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written
|
||
|
* if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
const unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx);
|
||
|
const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx);
|
||
|
int rv = -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
|
||
|
* Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
|
||
|
* communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
|
||
|
* side only.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (enc && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
|
||
|
: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
|
||
|
EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
|
||
|
in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
|
||
|
|
||
|
gctx->kma.param.taadl = gctx->tls_aad_len << 3;
|
||
|
gctx->kma.param.tpcl = len << 3;
|
||
|
s390x_kma(buf, gctx->tls_aad_len, in, len, out,
|
||
|
gctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD | S390X_KMA_LPC, &gctx->kma.param);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (enc) {
|
||
|
memcpy(out + len, gctx->kma.param.t.b, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
|
||
|
rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(gctx->kma.param.t.b, in + len,
|
||
|
EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
rv = len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
|
||
|
return rv;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional
|
||
|
* authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate
|
||
|
* ciphertext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes
|
||
|
* written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned. Code is big-endian.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
unsigned char *buf, tmp[16];
|
||
|
int enc;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!gctx->key_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
|
||
|
return s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!gctx->iv_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (in != NULL) {
|
||
|
if (out == NULL) {
|
||
|
if (s390x_aes_gcm_aad(gctx, in, len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (s390x_aes_gcm(gctx, in, out, len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return len;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
gctx->kma.param.taadl <<= 3;
|
||
|
gctx->kma.param.tpcl <<= 3;
|
||
|
s390x_kma(gctx->ares, gctx->areslen, gctx->mres, gctx->mreslen, tmp,
|
||
|
gctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD | S390X_KMA_LPC, &gctx->kma.param);
|
||
|
/* recall that we already did en-/decrypt gctx->mres
|
||
|
* and returned it to caller... */
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, gctx->mreslen);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx);
|
||
|
if (enc) {
|
||
|
gctx->taglen = 16;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (gctx->taglen < 0)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx);
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(buf, gctx->kma.param.t.b, gctx->taglen))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_GCM_CTX, c);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (gctx == NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
|
||
|
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(gctx, sizeof(*gctx));
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define S390X_AES_XTS_CTX EVP_AES_XTS_CTX
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_xts_init_key aes_xts_init_key
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_xts_cipher aes_xts_cipher
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_xts_ctrl aes_xts_ctrl
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_xts_cleanup aes_xts_cleanup
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Set nonce and length fields. Code is big-endian.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static inline void s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *nonce,
|
||
|
size_t mlen)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] &= ~S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG;
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.g[1] = mlen;
|
||
|
memcpy(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, nonce, 15 - ctx->aes.ccm.l);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Process additional authenticated data. Code is big-endian.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static void s390x_aes_ccm_aad(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *aad,
|
||
|
size_t alen)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *ptr;
|
||
|
int i, rem;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!alen)
|
||
|
return;
|
||
|
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] |= S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Suppress 'type-punned pointer dereference' warning. */
|
||
|
ptr = ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (alen < ((1 << 16) - (1 << 8))) {
|
||
|
*(uint16_t *)ptr = alen;
|
||
|
i = 2;
|
||
|
} else if (sizeof(alen) == 8
|
||
|
&& alen >= (size_t)1 << (32 % (sizeof(alen) * 8))) {
|
||
|
*(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xffff;
|
||
|
*(uint64_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen;
|
||
|
i = 10;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
*(uint16_t *)ptr = 0xfffe;
|
||
|
*(uint32_t *)(ptr + 2) = alen;
|
||
|
i = 6;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
while (i < 16 && alen) {
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = *aad;
|
||
|
++aad;
|
||
|
--alen;
|
||
|
++i;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
while (i < 16) {
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b[i] = 0;
|
||
|
++i;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] = 0;
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] = 0;
|
||
|
s390x_kmac(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 32, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
|
||
|
&ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += 2;
|
||
|
|
||
|
rem = alen & 0xf;
|
||
|
alen &= ~(size_t)0xf;
|
||
|
if (alen) {
|
||
|
s390x_kmac(aad, alen, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += alen >> 4;
|
||
|
aad += alen;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (rem) {
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < rem; i++)
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= aad[i];
|
||
|
|
||
|
s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16,
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* En/de-crypt plain/cipher-text. Compute tag from plaintext. Returns 0 for
|
||
|
* success.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ccm(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in,
|
||
|
unsigned char *out, size_t len, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
size_t n, rem;
|
||
|
unsigned int i, l, num;
|
||
|
unsigned char flags;
|
||
|
|
||
|
flags = ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0];
|
||
|
if (!(flags & S390X_CCM_AAD_FLAG)) {
|
||
|
s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b,
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.fc, ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.blocks++;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
l = flags & 0x7;
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = l;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Reconstruct length from encoded length field
|
||
|
* and initialize it with counter value.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
n = 0;
|
||
|
for (i = 15 - l; i < 15; i++) {
|
||
|
n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i];
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0;
|
||
|
n <<= 8;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
n |= ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15];
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[15] = 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (n != len)
|
||
|
return -1; /* length mismatch */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (enc) {
|
||
|
/* Two operations per block plus one for tag encryption */
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += (((len + 15) >> 4) << 1) + 1;
|
||
|
if (ctx->aes.ccm.blocks > (1ULL << 61))
|
||
|
return -2; /* too much data */
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
num = 0;
|
||
|
rem = len & 0xf;
|
||
|
len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (enc) {
|
||
|
/* mac-then-encrypt */
|
||
|
if (len)
|
||
|
s390x_kmac(in, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
|
||
|
if (rem) {
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < rem; i++)
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= in[len + i];
|
||
|
|
||
|
s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16,
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k,
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b,
|
||
|
&num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt);
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* decrypt-then-mac */
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len + rem, &ctx->aes.key.k,
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b,
|
||
|
&num, (ctr128_f)AES_ctr32_encrypt);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (len)
|
||
|
s390x_kmac(out, len, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
|
||
|
if (rem) {
|
||
|
for (i = 0; i < rem; i++)
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b[i] ^= out[len + i];
|
||
|
|
||
|
s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, 16,
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* encrypt tag */
|
||
|
for (i = 15 - l; i < 16; i++)
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[i] = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s390x_km(ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b, 16, ctx->aes.ccm.buf.b, ctx->aes.ccm.fc,
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k);
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[0] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[0];
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.g[1] ^= ctx->aes.ccm.buf.g[1];
|
||
|
|
||
|
ctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = flags; /* restore flags field */
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* En/de-crypt and authenticate TLS packet. Returns the number of bytes written
|
||
|
* if successful. Otherwise -1 is returned.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
unsigned char *ivec = ctx->iv;
|
||
|
unsigned char *buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx);
|
||
|
const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (out != in
|
||
|
|| len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->aes.ccm.m))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (enc) {
|
||
|
/* Set explicit iv (sequence number). */
|
||
|
memcpy(out, buf, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m;
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Get explicit iv (sequence number). We already have fixed iv
|
||
|
* (server/client_write_iv) here.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
memcpy(ivec + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in, EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
|
||
|
s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ivec, len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Process aad (sequence number|type|version|length) */
|
||
|
s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, buf, cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (enc) {
|
||
|
if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(out + len, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m);
|
||
|
return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->aes.ccm.m;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, in + len,
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.m))
|
||
|
return len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Set key and flag field and/or iv. Returns 1 if successful. Otherwise 0 is
|
||
|
* returned.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
int keylen;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key != NULL) {
|
||
|
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx);
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
|
||
|
memcpy(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k, key, keylen);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Store encoded m and l. */
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b[0] = ((cctx->aes.ccm.l - 1) & 0x7)
|
||
|
| (((cctx->aes.ccm.m - 2) >> 1) & 0x7) << 3;
|
||
|
memset(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b + 1, 0,
|
||
|
sizeof(cctx->aes.ccm.nonce.b));
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.blocks = 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv != NULL) {
|
||
|
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l);
|
||
|
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Called from EVP layer to initialize context, process additional
|
||
|
* authenticated data, en/de-crypt plain/cipher-text and authenticate
|
||
|
* plaintext or process a TLS packet, depending on context. Returns bytes
|
||
|
* written on success. Otherwise -1 is returned.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, ctx);
|
||
|
const int enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx);
|
||
|
int rv;
|
||
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!cctx->aes.ccm.key_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len >= 0)
|
||
|
return s390x_aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Final(): Does not return any data. Recall that ccm is mac-then-encrypt
|
||
|
* so integrity must be checked already at Update() i.e., before
|
||
|
* potentially corrupted data is output.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (in == NULL && out != NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (out == NULL) {
|
||
|
/* Update(): Pass message length. */
|
||
|
if (in == NULL) {
|
||
|
s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ctx->iv, len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1;
|
||
|
return len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Update(): Process aad. */
|
||
|
if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set && len)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
s390x_aes_ccm_aad(cctx, in, len);
|
||
|
return len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */
|
||
|
if (!enc && !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Update(): Process message. */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) {
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* In case message length was not previously set explicitly via
|
||
|
* Update(), set it now.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
s390x_aes_ccm_setiv(cctx, ctx->iv, len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (enc) {
|
||
|
if (s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1;
|
||
|
return len;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
rv = -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!s390x_aes_ccm(cctx, in, out, len, enc)) {
|
||
|
buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx);
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, buf,
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.m))
|
||
|
rv = len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (rv == -1)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
|
||
|
return rv;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*-
|
||
|
* Performs various operations on the context structure depending on control
|
||
|
* type. Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure and -1 for unknown control type.
|
||
|
* Code is big-endian.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
S390X_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(S390X_AES_CCM_CTX, c);
|
||
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
||
|
int enc, len;
|
||
|
|
||
|
switch (type) {
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.key_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.l = 8;
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.m = 12;
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = -1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
|
||
|
*(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->aes.ccm.l;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
|
||
|
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Save the aad for later use. */
|
||
|
buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
|
||
|
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = arg;
|
||
|
|
||
|
len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
|
||
|
if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Correct length for explicit iv. */
|
||
|
len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
|
||
|
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c);
|
||
|
if (!enc) {
|
||
|
if (len < cctx->aes.ccm.m)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Correct length for tag. */
|
||
|
len -= cctx->aes.ccm.m;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
|
||
|
buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */
|
||
|
return cctx->aes.ccm.m;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
|
||
|
if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Copy to first part of the iv. */
|
||
|
memcpy(c->iv, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
|
||
|
arg = 15 - arg;
|
||
|
/* fall-through */
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L:
|
||
|
if (arg < 2 || arg > 8)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.l = arg;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
|
||
|
if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c);
|
||
|
if (enc && ptr)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ptr) {
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 1;
|
||
|
buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
|
||
|
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.m = arg;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
|
||
|
enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c);
|
||
|
if (!enc || !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (arg < cctx->aes.ccm.m)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(ptr, cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.icv.b, cctx->aes.ccm.m);
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->aes.ccm.len_set = 0;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_ccm_cleanup aes_ccm_cleanup
|
||
|
|
||
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
|
||
|
# define S390X_AES_OCB_CTX EVP_AES_OCB_CTX
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_ocb_init_key aes_ocb_init_key
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_ocb_cipher aes_ocb_cipher
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_ocb_cleanup aes_ocb_cleanup
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl aes_ocb_ctrl
|
||
|
static int s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
|
||
|
# endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV
|
||
|
# define S390X_AES_SIV_CTX EVP_AES_SIV_CTX
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_siv_cleanup aes_siv_cleanup
|
||
|
# define s390x_aes_siv_ctrl aes_siv_ctrl
|
||
|
# endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode, \
|
||
|
MODE,flags) \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize, \
|
||
|
keylen / 8, \
|
||
|
ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \
|
||
|
s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
sizeof(S390X_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
NULL \
|
||
|
}; \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode, \
|
||
|
blocksize, \
|
||
|
keylen / 8, \
|
||
|
ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aes_init_key, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
NULL \
|
||
|
}; \
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
|
||
|
{ \
|
||
|
return S390X_aes_##keylen##_##mode##_CAPABLE ? \
|
||
|
&s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags)\
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##mode, \
|
||
|
blocksize, \
|
||
|
(EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
|
||
|
ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \
|
||
|
s390x_aes_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
s390x_aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
|
||
|
sizeof(S390X_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
s390x_aes_##mode##_ctrl, \
|
||
|
NULL \
|
||
|
}; \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
|
||
|
(EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
|
||
|
ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_ctrl, \
|
||
|
NULL \
|
||
|
}; \
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
|
||
|
{ \
|
||
|
return S390X_aes_##keylen##_##mode##_CAPABLE ? \
|
||
|
&s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode : &aes_##keylen##_##mode; \
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aes_init_key, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
NULL, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_KEY), \
|
||
|
NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL }; \
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
|
||
|
{ return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
|
||
|
|
||
|
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
|
||
|
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
|
||
|
(EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
|
||
|
ivlen, \
|
||
|
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
|
||
|
EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
|
||
|
aes_##mode##_cleanup, \
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_##MODE##_CTX), \
|
||
|
NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_##keylen##_##mode(void) \
|
||
|
{ return &aes_##keylen##_##mode; }
|
||
|
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
|
||
|
#define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(nid,keylen,flags) \
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,16,cbc,cbc,CBC,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,16,0,ecb,ecb,ECB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ofb128,ofb,OFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb128,cfb,CFB,flags|EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) \
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb1,cfb1,CFB,flags) \
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,cfb8,cfb8,CFB,flags) \
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,1,16,ctr,ctr,CTR,flags)
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int ret, mode;
|
||
|
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ctx);
|
||
|
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
|
||
|
&& !enc) {
|
||
|
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
ret = HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks);
|
||
|
dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt;
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
|
||
|
# ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt
|
||
|
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt;
|
||
|
# endif
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
|
||
|
ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks);
|
||
|
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) ossl_bsaes_cbc_encrypt;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks);
|
||
|
dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
|
||
|
(cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks);
|
||
|
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
|
||
|
(cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
ret = HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks);
|
||
|
dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
|
||
|
# ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt
|
||
|
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
# endif
|
||
|
# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
|
||
|
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
|
||
|
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
# endif
|
||
|
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
|
||
|
ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks);
|
||
|
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
|
||
|
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) ossl_bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks);
|
||
|
dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
|
||
|
(cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &dat->ks.ks);
|
||
|
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
|
||
|
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
|
||
|
(cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
|
||
|
#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
|
||
|
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
|
||
|
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (dat->stream.cbc)
|
||
|
(*dat->stream.cbc) (in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx));
|
||
|
else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx))
|
||
|
CRYPTO_cbc128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks, ctx->iv,
|
||
|
dat->block);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
CRYPTO_cbc128_decrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
|
||
|
ctx->iv, dat->block);
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ctx);
|
||
|
size_t i;
|
||
|
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (len < bl)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl)
|
||
|
(*dat->block) (in + i, out + i, &dat->ks);
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_ofb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ofb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
|
||
|
ctx->iv, &num, dat->block);
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
|
||
|
ctx->iv, &num,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_cfb8_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_cfb128_8_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
|
||
|
ctx->iv, &num,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_cfb1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) {
|
||
|
int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
|
||
|
ctx->iv, &num,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
while (len >= MAXBITCHUNK) {
|
||
|
int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, MAXBITCHUNK * 8, &dat->ks,
|
||
|
ctx->iv, &num,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
|
||
|
len -= MAXBITCHUNK;
|
||
|
out += MAXBITCHUNK;
|
||
|
in += MAXBITCHUNK;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (len) {
|
||
|
int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_cfb128_1_encrypt(in, out, len * 8, &dat->ks,
|
||
|
ctx->iv, &num,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_ctr_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int n = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_num(ctx);
|
||
|
unsigned int num;
|
||
|
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (n < 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
num = (unsigned int)n;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (dat->stream.ctr)
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt_ctr32(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
|
||
|
ctx->iv,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
|
||
|
&num, dat->stream.ctr);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ctr128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
|
||
|
ctx->iv,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), &num,
|
||
|
dat->block);
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 128, 0)
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 192, 0)
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_generic_pack(NID_aes, 256, 0)
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
|
||
|
if (gctx == NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
|
||
|
if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
|
||
|
switch (type) {
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
|
||
|
gctx->key_set = 0;
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher);
|
||
|
gctx->iv = c->iv;
|
||
|
gctx->taglen = -1;
|
||
|
gctx->iv_gen = 0;
|
||
|
gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
|
||
|
*(int *)ptr = gctx->ivlen;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
|
||
|
if (arg <= 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
/* Allocate memory for IV if needed */
|
||
|
if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
|
||
|
if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
|
||
|
if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg)) == NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
gctx->ivlen = arg;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
|
||
|
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
gctx->taglen = arg;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
|
||
|
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt
|
||
|
|| gctx->taglen < 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
|
||
|
/* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */
|
||
|
if (arg == -1) {
|
||
|
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least
|
||
|
* 8.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
if (arg)
|
||
|
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
if (c->encrypt && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN:
|
||
|
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen)
|
||
|
arg = gctx->ivlen;
|
||
|
memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
|
||
|
* to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
|
||
|
if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
|
||
|
/* Save the AAD for later use */
|
||
|
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
|
||
|
gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
|
||
|
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
|
||
|
if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
|
||
|
if (!c->encrypt) {
|
||
|
if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
c->buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
|
||
|
c->buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
|
||
|
return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
|
||
|
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,out);
|
||
|
if (gctx->gcm.key) {
|
||
|
if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (gctx->iv == c->iv)
|
||
|
gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
|
||
|
else {
|
||
|
if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen)) == NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key != NULL) {
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
do {
|
||
|
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
|
||
|
(block128_f) HWAES_encrypt);
|
||
|
# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
|
||
|
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
|
||
|
# else
|
||
|
gctx->ctr = NULL;
|
||
|
# endif
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (BSAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
|
||
|
(block128_f) AES_encrypt);
|
||
|
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) ossl_bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
|
||
|
(block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
|
||
|
gctx->ctr = NULL;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
|
||
|
|
||
|
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &gctx->ks.ks);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
|
||
|
(block128_f) AES_encrypt);
|
||
|
#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
|
||
|
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt;
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
gctx->ctr = NULL;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
} while (0);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
|
||
|
iv = gctx->iv;
|
||
|
if (iv) {
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
gctx->key_set = 1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
|
||
|
if (gctx->key_set)
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
gctx->iv_gen = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV
|
||
|
* followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV,
|
||
|
* encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload
|
||
|
* and verify tag.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
int rv = -1;
|
||
|
/* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */
|
||
|
if (out != in
|
||
|
|| len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
|
||
|
* Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
|
||
|
* communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
|
||
|
* side only.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
|
||
|
* buffer.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) ?
|
||
|
EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
|
||
|
EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
/* Use saved AAD */
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
|
||
|
gctx->tls_aad_len))
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
/* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */
|
||
|
in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) {
|
||
|
/* Encrypt payload */
|
||
|
if (gctx->ctr) {
|
||
|
size_t bulk = 0;
|
||
|
#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
|
||
|
if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.key,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
|
||
|
in + bulk,
|
||
|
out + bulk,
|
||
|
len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
size_t bulk = 0;
|
||
|
#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
|
||
|
if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in, out, len,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.key,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm,
|
||
|
in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
out += len;
|
||
|
/* Finally write tag */
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, out, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
|
||
|
rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* Decrypt */
|
||
|
if (gctx->ctr) {
|
||
|
size_t bulk = 0;
|
||
|
#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
|
||
|
if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.key,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
|
||
|
in + bulk,
|
||
|
out + bulk,
|
||
|
len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
size_t bulk = 0;
|
||
|
#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
|
||
|
if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, NULL, NULL, 0))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in, out, len,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.key,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm,
|
||
|
in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* Retrieve tag */
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
|
||
|
EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
|
||
|
/* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), in + len,
|
||
|
EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
|
||
|
goto err;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
rv = len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
err:
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
|
||
|
return rv;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* See SP800-38D (GCM) Section 8 "Uniqueness requirement on IVS and keys"
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* See also 8.2.2 RBG-based construction.
|
||
|
* Random construction consists of a free field (which can be NULL) and a
|
||
|
* random field which will use a DRBG that can return at least 96 bits of
|
||
|
* entropy strength. (The DRBG must be seeded by the FIPS module).
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
static int aes_gcm_iv_generate(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx, int offset)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int sz = gctx->ivlen - offset;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Must be at least 96 bits */
|
||
|
if (sz <= 0 || gctx->ivlen < 12)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Use DRBG to generate random iv */
|
||
|
if (RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + offset, sz) <= 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If not set up, return error */
|
||
|
if (!gctx->key_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
|
||
|
return aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* FIPS requires generation of AES-GCM IV's inside the FIPS module.
|
||
|
* The IV can still be set externally (the security policy will state that
|
||
|
* this is not FIPS compliant). There are some applications
|
||
|
* where setting the IV externally is the only option available.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (!gctx->iv_set) {
|
||
|
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) || !aes_gcm_iv_generate(gctx, 0))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
gctx->iv_gen_rand = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
if (!gctx->iv_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (in) {
|
||
|
if (out == NULL) {
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
} else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) {
|
||
|
if (gctx->ctr) {
|
||
|
size_t bulk = 0;
|
||
|
#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
|
||
|
if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
|
||
|
size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res,
|
||
|
out + res, len - res,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
|
||
|
bulk += res;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
|
||
|
in + bulk,
|
||
|
out + bulk,
|
||
|
len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
size_t bulk = 0;
|
||
|
#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
|
||
|
if (len >= 32 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
|
||
|
size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
bulk = AES_gcm_encrypt(in + res,
|
||
|
out + res, len - res,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.key, gctx->gcm.Yi.c,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
|
||
|
bulk += res;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm,
|
||
|
in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (gctx->ctr) {
|
||
|
size_t bulk = 0;
|
||
|
#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
|
||
|
if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM(gctx)) {
|
||
|
size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res,
|
||
|
out + res, len - res,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.key,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
|
||
|
bulk += res;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
|
||
|
in + bulk,
|
||
|
out + bulk,
|
||
|
len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
size_t bulk = 0;
|
||
|
#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM2)
|
||
|
if (len >= 16 && AES_GCM_ASM2(gctx)) {
|
||
|
size_t res = (16 - gctx->gcm.mres) % 16;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm, in, out, res))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
bulk = AES_gcm_decrypt(in + res,
|
||
|
out + res, len - res,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.key,
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.Yi.c, gctx->gcm.Xi.u);
|
||
|
gctx->gcm.len.u[1] += bulk;
|
||
|
bulk += res;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm,
|
||
|
in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return len;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) {
|
||
|
if (gctx->taglen < 0)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
|
||
|
gctx->taglen) != 0)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), 16);
|
||
|
gctx->taglen = 16;
|
||
|
/* Don't reuse the IV */
|
||
|
gctx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#define CUSTOM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
|
||
|
| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
|
||
|
| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
|
||
|
| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV_LENGTH)
|
||
|
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, gcm, GCM,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, c);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) {
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
|
||
|
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,out);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (xctx->xts.key1) {
|
||
|
if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
xctx_out->xts.key1 = &xctx_out->ks1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (xctx->xts.key2) {
|
||
|
if (xctx->xts.key2 != &xctx->ks2)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
xctx_out->xts.key2 = &xctx_out->ks2;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
} else if (type != EVP_CTRL_INIT)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
/* key1 and key2 are used as an indicator both key and IV are set */
|
||
|
xctx->xts.key1 = NULL;
|
||
|
xctx->xts.key2 = NULL;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key != NULL) {
|
||
|
do {
|
||
|
/* The key is two half length keys in reality */
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx);
|
||
|
const int bytes = keylen / 2;
|
||
|
const int bits = bytes * 8;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Verify that the two keys are different.
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's
|
||
|
* September 2004 paper:
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and
|
||
|
* Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC".
|
||
|
* (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf)
|
||
|
*
|
||
|
* FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states
|
||
|
* that:
|
||
|
* "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place
|
||
|
* BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process
|
||
|
* data with them."
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc)
|
||
|
&& CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
|
||
|
xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt;
|
||
|
#else
|
||
|
xctx->stream = NULL;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
/* key_len is two AES keys */
|
||
|
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
if (enc) {
|
||
|
HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
|
||
|
# ifdef HWAES_xts_encrypt
|
||
|
xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_encrypt;
|
||
|
# endif
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt;
|
||
|
# ifdef HWAES_xts_decrypt
|
||
|
xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_decrypt;
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
|
||
|
|
||
|
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (BSAES_CAPABLE)
|
||
|
xctx->stream = enc ? ossl_bsaes_xts_encrypt : ossl_bsaes_xts_decrypt;
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
if (enc) {
|
||
|
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
|
||
|
|
||
|
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (enc) {
|
||
|
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
AES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
AES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
|
||
|
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
|
||
|
|
||
|
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
|
||
|
} while (0);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv) {
|
||
|
xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
|
||
|
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 16);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (xctx->xts.key1 == NULL
|
||
|
|| xctx->xts.key2 == NULL
|
||
|
|| out == NULL
|
||
|
|| in == NULL
|
||
|
|| len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Impose a limit of 2^20 blocks per data unit as specified by
|
||
|
* IEEE Std 1619-2018. The earlier and obsolete IEEE Std 1619-2007
|
||
|
* indicated that this was a SHOULD NOT rather than a MUST NOT.
|
||
|
* NIST SP 800-38E mandates the same limit.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (len > XTS_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_DATA_UNIT * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (xctx->stream)
|
||
|
(*xctx->stream) (in, out, len,
|
||
|
xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2,
|
||
|
ctx->iv);
|
||
|
else if (CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&xctx->xts, ctx->iv, in, out, len,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#define aes_xts_cleanup NULL
|
||
|
|
||
|
#define XTS_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \
|
||
|
| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
|
||
|
| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
|
||
|
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS)
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 16, xts, XTS, XTS_FLAGS)
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_ccm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,c);
|
||
|
switch (type) {
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
|
||
|
cctx->key_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->L = 8;
|
||
|
cctx->M = 12;
|
||
|
cctx->tag_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->len_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
|
||
|
*(int *)ptr = 15 - cctx->L;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
|
||
|
/* Save the AAD for later use */
|
||
|
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
|
||
|
cctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
uint16_t len =
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
|
||
|
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
|
||
|
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
|
||
|
if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
|
||
|
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c)) {
|
||
|
if (len < cctx->M)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
len -= cctx->M;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
|
||
|
return cctx->M;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
|
||
|
/* Sanity check length */
|
||
|
if (arg != EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
/* Just copy to first part of IV */
|
||
|
memcpy(c->iv, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
|
||
|
arg = 15 - arg;
|
||
|
/* fall through */
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L:
|
||
|
if (arg < 2 || arg > 8)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
cctx->L = arg;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
|
||
|
if ((arg & 1) || arg < 4 || arg > 16)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c) && ptr)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
if (ptr) {
|
||
|
cctx->tag_set = 1;
|
||
|
memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
cctx->M = arg;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
|
||
|
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c) || !cctx->tag_set)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(&cctx->ccm, ptr, (size_t)arg))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
cctx->tag_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->len_set = 0;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
|
||
|
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,out);
|
||
|
if (cctx->ccm.key) {
|
||
|
if (cctx->ccm.key != &cctx->ks)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
cctx_out->ccm.key = &cctx_out->ks;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_ccm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key != NULL) {
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
do {
|
||
|
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks);
|
||
|
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
|
||
|
&cctx->ks, (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt);
|
||
|
cctx->str = NULL;
|
||
|
cctx->key_set = 1;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
} else
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
|
||
|
&cctx->ks, (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
|
||
|
cctx->str = NULL;
|
||
|
cctx->key_set = 1;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &cctx->ks.ks);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ccm128_init(&cctx->ccm, cctx->M, cctx->L,
|
||
|
&cctx->ks, (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
|
||
|
cctx->str = NULL;
|
||
|
cctx->key_set = 1;
|
||
|
} while (0);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (iv != NULL) {
|
||
|
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, 15 - cctx->L);
|
||
|
cctx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_ccm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm;
|
||
|
/* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */
|
||
|
if (out != in || len < (EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + (size_t)cctx->M))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
/* If encrypting set explicit IV from sequence number (start of AAD) */
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx))
|
||
|
memcpy(out, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
|
||
|
EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
|
||
|
/* Get rest of IV from explicit IV */
|
||
|
memcpy(ctx->iv + EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, in,
|
||
|
EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
|
||
|
/* Correct length value */
|
||
|
len -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M;
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L,
|
||
|
len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
/* Use saved AAD */
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
|
||
|
cctx->tls_aad_len);
|
||
|
/* Fix buffer to point to payload */
|
||
|
in += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
out += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) {
|
||
|
if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
|
||
|
cctx->str) :
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, out + len, cctx->M))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
return len + EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + cctx->M;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
|
||
|
cctx->str) :
|
||
|
!CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
|
||
|
unsigned char tag[16];
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in + len, cctx->M))
|
||
|
return len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm;
|
||
|
/* If not set up, return error */
|
||
|
if (!cctx->key_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (cctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
|
||
|
return aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */
|
||
|
if (in == NULL && out != NULL)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!cctx->iv_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!out) {
|
||
|
if (!in) {
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv,
|
||
|
15 - cctx->L, len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
cctx->len_set = 1;
|
||
|
return len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* If have AAD need message length */
|
||
|
if (!cctx->len_set && len)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len);
|
||
|
return len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */
|
||
|
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If not set length yet do it */
|
||
|
if (!cctx->len_set) {
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, ctx->iv, 15 - cctx->L, len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
cctx->len_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) {
|
||
|
if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
|
||
|
cctx->str) :
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
cctx->tag_set = 1;
|
||
|
return len;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
int rv = -1;
|
||
|
if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
|
||
|
cctx->str) :
|
||
|
!CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
|
||
|
unsigned char tag[16];
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
|
||
|
cctx->M))
|
||
|
rv = len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (rv == -1)
|
||
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
|
||
|
cctx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->tag_set = 0;
|
||
|
cctx->len_set = 0;
|
||
|
return rv;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#define aes_ccm_cleanup NULL
|
||
|
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 12, ccm, CCM,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
|
||
|
|
||
|
typedef struct {
|
||
|
union {
|
||
|
OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
|
||
|
AES_KEY ks;
|
||
|
} ks;
|
||
|
/* Indicates if IV has been set */
|
||
|
unsigned char *iv;
|
||
|
} EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX;
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_wrap_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
int len;
|
||
|
EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
if (key != NULL) {
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx))
|
||
|
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &wctx->ks.ks);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &wctx->ks.ks);
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL)
|
||
|
wctx->iv = NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (iv != NULL) {
|
||
|
if ((len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx)) < 0)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len);
|
||
|
wctx->iv = ctx->iv;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_wrap_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX *wctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
size_t rv;
|
||
|
/* AES wrap with padding has IV length of 4, without padding 8 */
|
||
|
int pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx) == 4;
|
||
|
/* No final operation so always return zero length */
|
||
|
if (!in)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
/* Input length must always be non-zero */
|
||
|
if (!inlen)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
/* If decrypting need at least 16 bytes and multiple of 8 */
|
||
|
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx) && (inlen < 16 || inlen & 0x7))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
/* If not padding input must be multiple of 8 */
|
||
|
if (!pad && inlen & 0x7)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
if (ossl_is_partially_overlapping(out, in, inlen)) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (!out) {
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) {
|
||
|
/* If padding round up to multiple of 8 */
|
||
|
if (pad)
|
||
|
inlen = (inlen + 7) / 8 * 8;
|
||
|
/* 8 byte prefix */
|
||
|
return inlen + 8;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* If not padding output will be exactly 8 bytes smaller than
|
||
|
* input. If padding it will be at least 8 bytes smaller but we
|
||
|
* don't know how much.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
return inlen - 8;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (pad) {
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx))
|
||
|
rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv,
|
||
|
out, in, inlen,
|
||
|
(block128_f) AES_encrypt);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv,
|
||
|
out, in, inlen,
|
||
|
(block128_f) AES_decrypt);
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx))
|
||
|
rv = CRYPTO_128_wrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv,
|
||
|
out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_encrypt);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
rv = CRYPTO_128_unwrap(&wctx->ks.ks, wctx->iv,
|
||
|
out, in, inlen, (block128_f) AES_decrypt);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return rv ? (int)rv : -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#define WRAP_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE \
|
||
|
| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
|
||
|
| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
|
||
|
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap = {
|
||
|
NID_id_aes128_wrap,
|
||
|
8, 16, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL,
|
||
|
aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
|
||
|
NULL,
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
|
||
|
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
|
||
|
};
|
||
|
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap(void)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
return &aes_128_wrap;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap = {
|
||
|
NID_id_aes192_wrap,
|
||
|
8, 24, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL,
|
||
|
aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
|
||
|
NULL,
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
|
||
|
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
|
||
|
};
|
||
|
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap(void)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
return &aes_192_wrap;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap = {
|
||
|
NID_id_aes256_wrap,
|
||
|
8, 32, 8, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL,
|
||
|
aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
|
||
|
NULL,
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
|
||
|
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
|
||
|
};
|
||
|
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap(void)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
return &aes_256_wrap;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_128_wrap_pad = {
|
||
|
NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad,
|
||
|
8, 16, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL,
|
||
|
aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
|
||
|
NULL,
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
|
||
|
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
|
||
|
};
|
||
|
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad(void)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
return &aes_128_wrap_pad;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_192_wrap_pad = {
|
||
|
NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad,
|
||
|
8, 24, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL,
|
||
|
aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
|
||
|
NULL,
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
|
||
|
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
|
||
|
};
|
||
|
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_192_wrap_pad(void)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
return &aes_192_wrap_pad;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_256_wrap_pad = {
|
||
|
NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad,
|
||
|
8, 32, 4, WRAP_FLAGS, EVP_ORIG_GLOBAL,
|
||
|
aes_wrap_init_key, aes_wrap_cipher,
|
||
|
NULL,
|
||
|
sizeof(EVP_AES_WRAP_CTX),
|
||
|
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL
|
||
|
};
|
||
|
|
||
|
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_256_wrap_pad(void)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
return &aes_256_wrap_pad;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
|
||
|
static int aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,c);
|
||
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *newc;
|
||
|
EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *new_octx;
|
||
|
|
||
|
switch (type) {
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
|
||
|
octx->key_set = 0;
|
||
|
octx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
octx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c->cipher);
|
||
|
octx->iv = c->iv;
|
||
|
octx->taglen = 16;
|
||
|
octx->data_buf_len = 0;
|
||
|
octx->aad_buf_len = 0;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_GET_IVLEN:
|
||
|
*(int *)ptr = octx->ivlen;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
|
||
|
/* IV len must be 1 to 15 */
|
||
|
if (arg <= 0 || arg > 15)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
octx->ivlen = arg;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
|
||
|
if (ptr == NULL) {
|
||
|
/* Tag len must be 0 to 16 */
|
||
|
if (arg < 0 || arg > 16)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
octx->taglen = arg;
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (arg != octx->taglen || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
memcpy(octx->tag, ptr, arg);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
|
||
|
if (arg != octx->taglen || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(c))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
||
|
memcpy(ptr, octx->tag, arg);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
|
||
|
newc = (EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)ptr;
|
||
|
new_octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,newc);
|
||
|
return CRYPTO_ocb128_copy_ctx(&new_octx->ocb, &octx->ocb,
|
||
|
&new_octx->ksenc.ks,
|
||
|
&new_octx->ksdec.ks);
|
||
|
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_ocb_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && key == NULL)
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (key != NULL) {
|
||
|
const int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_key_length(ctx) * 8;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (keylen <= 0) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
do {
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* We set both the encrypt and decrypt key here because decrypt
|
||
|
* needs both. We could possibly optimise to remove setting the
|
||
|
* decrypt for an encryption operation.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
# ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks);
|
||
|
HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks);
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
|
||
|
&octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
|
||
|
(block128_f) HWAES_encrypt,
|
||
|
(block128_f) HWAES_decrypt,
|
||
|
enc ? HWAES_ocb_encrypt
|
||
|
: HWAES_ocb_decrypt))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
# endif
|
||
|
# ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
|
||
|
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
|
||
|
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks);
|
||
|
vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks);
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
|
||
|
&octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
|
||
|
(block128_f) vpaes_encrypt,
|
||
|
(block128_f) vpaes_decrypt,
|
||
|
NULL))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
# endif
|
||
|
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksenc.ks);
|
||
|
AES_set_decrypt_key(key, keylen, &octx->ksdec.ks);
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_init(&octx->ocb,
|
||
|
&octx->ksenc.ks, &octx->ksdec.ks,
|
||
|
(block128_f) AES_encrypt,
|
||
|
(block128_f) AES_decrypt,
|
||
|
NULL))
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
while (0);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* If we have an iv we can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (iv == NULL && octx->iv_set)
|
||
|
iv = octx->iv;
|
||
|
if (iv) {
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen)
|
||
|
!= 1)
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
octx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
octx->key_set = 1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
|
||
|
if (octx->key_set)
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ocb128_setiv(&octx->ocb, iv, octx->ivlen, octx->taglen);
|
||
|
else
|
||
|
memcpy(octx->iv, iv, octx->ivlen);
|
||
|
octx->iv_set = 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_ocb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
|
||
|
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
||
|
int *buf_len;
|
||
|
int written_len = 0;
|
||
|
size_t trailing_len;
|
||
|
EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,ctx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If IV or Key not set then return error */
|
||
|
if (!octx->iv_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!octx->key_set)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (in != NULL) {
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* Need to ensure we are only passing full blocks to low-level OCB
|
||
|
* routines. We do it here rather than in EVP_EncryptUpdate/
|
||
|
* EVP_DecryptUpdate because we need to pass full blocks of AAD too
|
||
|
* and those routines don't support that
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Are we dealing with AAD or normal data here? */
|
||
|
if (out == NULL) {
|
||
|
buf = octx->aad_buf;
|
||
|
buf_len = &(octx->aad_buf_len);
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
buf = octx->data_buf;
|
||
|
buf_len = &(octx->data_buf_len);
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (ossl_is_partially_overlapping(out + *buf_len, in, len)) {
|
||
|
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* If we've got a partially filled buffer from a previous call then
|
||
|
* use that data first
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (*buf_len > 0) {
|
||
|
unsigned int remaining;
|
||
|
|
||
|
remaining = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (*buf_len);
|
||
|
if (remaining > len) {
|
||
|
memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, len);
|
||
|
*(buf_len) += len;
|
||
|
return 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
memcpy(buf + (*buf_len), in, remaining);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* If we get here we've filled the buffer, so process it
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
len -= remaining;
|
||
|
in += remaining;
|
||
|
if (out == NULL) {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
} else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out,
|
||
|
AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, buf, out,
|
||
|
AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
written_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
||
|
*buf_len = 0;
|
||
|
if (out != NULL)
|
||
|
out += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Do we have a partial block to handle at the end? */
|
||
|
trailing_len = len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* If we've got some full blocks to handle, then process these first
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (len != trailing_len) {
|
||
|
if (out == NULL) {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad(&octx->ocb, in, len - trailing_len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
} else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt
|
||
|
(&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt
|
||
|
(&octx->ocb, in, out, len - trailing_len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
written_len += len - trailing_len;
|
||
|
in += len - trailing_len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Handle any trailing partial block */
|
||
|
if (trailing_len > 0) {
|
||
|
memcpy(buf, in, trailing_len);
|
||
|
*buf_len = trailing_len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
return written_len;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
/*
|
||
|
* First of all empty the buffer of any partial block that we might
|
||
|
* have been provided - both for data and AAD
|
||
|
*/
|
||
|
if (octx->data_buf_len > 0) {
|
||
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_encrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out,
|
||
|
octx->data_buf_len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
} else {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_decrypt(&octx->ocb, octx->data_buf, out,
|
||
|
octx->data_buf_len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
written_len = octx->data_buf_len;
|
||
|
octx->data_buf_len = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (octx->aad_buf_len > 0) {
|
||
|
if (!CRYPTO_ocb128_aad
|
||
|
(&octx->ocb, octx->aad_buf, octx->aad_buf_len))
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
octx->aad_buf_len = 0;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* If decrypting then verify */
|
||
|
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_is_encrypting(ctx)) {
|
||
|
if (octx->taglen < 0)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_ocb128_finish(&octx->ocb,
|
||
|
octx->tag, octx->taglen) != 0)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
octx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
return written_len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
/* If encrypting then just get the tag */
|
||
|
if (CRYPTO_ocb128_tag(&octx->ocb, octx->tag, 16) != 1)
|
||
|
return -1;
|
||
|
/* Don't reuse the IV */
|
||
|
octx->iv_set = 0;
|
||
|
return written_len;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
static int aes_ocb_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
EVP_AES_OCB_CTX *octx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_OCB_CTX,c);
|
||
|
CRYPTO_ocb128_cleanup(&octx->ocb);
|
||
|
return 1;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 16, 12, ocb, OCB,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 16, 12, ocb, OCB,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
|
||
|
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 16, 12, ocb, OCB,
|
||
|
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
|
||
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
|